Abstract Monadic predicates for "good" and "bad" are inserted into structures already containing the dyadic predicate "better". A set of logical properties for "good" and "bad" is proposed, and a complete characterization is given of the pairs of monadic predicates that have these properties. It is argued that "good" and "bad" can indeed be defined in terms of "better", and a definition is given that is more generally applicable than those previously proposed.
ther better nor worse than its negation. Then "a state of affairs is good provided it is better than some state of affairs that is indifferent, and ... a state of affairs is bad provided some state of affairs that is indifferent is better than it". Chisholm and Sosa's approach may be seen as a special case of a more general format for defining "good" and "bad" delineated by van Dalen [6] . This format consists of the introduction of a set of neutral propositions. Then anything that is better than some neutral proposition is good, and anything that is worse than some neutral proposition is bad.
Danielsson ([7] , p. 37) introduced another definition that falls within van Dalen's general framework. According to Danielsson, a statement is good if and only if it is better than some tautology, and bad if and only if it is worse than some tautology. (This definition was, according to Danielsson, originally proposed by Bengt Hansson in an unpublished essay.) The use of contradictions, instead of tautologies, as indifference points, was hinted at by von Wright ( [20] , p. 164).
Preference structures
This article is devoted to the investigation of the insertion of monadic predicates for "good" and "bad" into structures already containing a dyadic predicate for "better". The predicates will be considered as referring to propositions that represent states of affairs. Throughout the article, standard first-order logic and the intersubstitutivity of logically equivalent propositions will be assumed to hold.
Definition Dl
Let L be any language. Then a preference structure on L is a pair (L,R), where R is a reflexive relation on L.
In this paper, R represents the notion "better than or equal in value to". The predicates P for "better than", I for "equal in value to", and C for "comparable to" will be defined in the usual way. Our definition of a preference structure is very weak. In particular, the conditions of transitivity ((pRq & qRr) -+pRr) and completeness (pRq v qRp) are absent from the definition.
The transitivity of weak preference (R) implies transitivity of indifference (I). This is a highly controversial assumption that "has as an instance that if Henry is indifferent between cups of coffee with 1 grain of sugar and 2 grains, 2 grains and 3 grains, . . . , 499 grains and 500 grains, then Henry will be (and/or ought to be) indifferent between cups with 1 grain and 500 grains" ( [15] , p. 252). The transitivity of strict preference (P) has also been challenged by several authors (see [1] , [10] , [17] ).
As I argue more in detail elsewhere (see [9] ), completeness, i.e., full comparability between alternatives, does not always hold. I may be sure that I prefer winning $5000 in a lottery to winning $50 in that same lottery. I may also be sure that I prefer my friend Bob being promoted on his job to him staying in the same position. However, I may still not know which I prefer, myself winning $5000 or Bob being promoted.
In view of the problematic character of these two conditions, it should be seen as an advantage of the present formal system that it takes neither transitivity nor completeness for granted. However, a weaker comparability assumption will be needed for most of the results.
Definition D3
A preference structure (L,R) fulfills the weak comparability assumption (WCA) iff for all/?, q GL, if pCq and/? and q are not logically equivalent, then/?C~/?.
The following defined dyadic operators will be needed.
Definition D4
pR R* will be called "iterated weak preference", I* "iterated indifference", and P + "iterated strict preference". Conjunctions with the symbols R, P, I, C, R*, I*, and P + will be contracted, writing pRqlr for pRq & qlr, pR*ql*sl~s for pR*q & qΓs & sl~s, etc.
3 The logical properties of "good" and "bad"
"Good" is a positive value predicate, just like "best", "not worst", "very good", "excellent", "not very bad", etc. Each of these predicates has the property of being applicable to everything that is better or equal in value to something that it is applicable to. This property will be called "positivity".
Similarly, "bad" is one of the predicates with the converse property, that it is applicable to whatever is worse than or equal in value to something that the predicate is applicable to.
Definition D5
Let H be a monadic predicate on the preference structure <L,R). Then H fulfills positivity iff for all p,qeL,Up&
A pair <G,B> of monadic predicates on (L,R) fulfills the combined property of positivity/negativity (PN) iff G fulfills positivity and B fulfills negativity.
PN is fulfilled not only by "good" and "bad", but also by many other pairs of monadic value predicates, such as "very good" and "very bad", or "not worst" and "not best". Other intuitions will have to be invoked, therefore, to characterize the notions "good" and "bad".
One such intuition is mutual exclusiveness. It does not seem reasonable to say that something is (from the same point of view) both good and bad.
Definition D6
Let <G,B> be a pair of monadic predicates on (L,R). Then <G,B> fulfills mutual exclusiveness (ME) iff for all p G L, ~(Gp & B/?).
A related intuition is that a state of affairs and its negation are not both good or both bad. If I say that it is good that p, but also that it would be good if -/?, then I will be taken to refer to different standards in the two uses of the word "good". This property will be called "nonduplicity".
Definition D7
Let <G,B> be a pair of monadic predicates on (L,R). Then <G,B> fulfills nonduplicity (ND) iff for allpeL,~(Gp& G~p) and ~(Bp & Furthermore, "good" and "bad" are a pair of operators that come very close to each other, so that they only have "neutral" values between them. One way to express this is "that things which are neither good nor bad are not among themselves better or worse" ( [20] , p. 161). Another is that "if two things are of unequal value, then at least one of them must be good or at least one of them bad" (ibid.). These two formulations can be shown to be equivalent for pairs of operators that fulfill PN.
Theorem Tl
Let (L,R) be α preference structure and <G,B> a pair of monadic predicates over (L,R) that fulfills PN. Then each of the following two conditions on <G,B> holds iff the other holds:
(For proofs of the theorems, see the Appendix.) The shorter of the two formulas, viz. (b), will be used in the definition of closeness.
Definition D8
Let <G,B> be a pair of monadic predicates on the preference structure (L,R). Then <G,B> fulfills closeness (CL) iff for all/7, q G L, pVq -* Gp v Bq.
It will not be assumed that all states of affairs are comparable to their negations. However, the following weaker comparability condition will be needed in several of the results of the following sections.
Definition D9
Let <G,B> be a pair of monadic predicates on the preference structure (L,R). Then <G,B> fulfills comparability with negation
The search for pairs corresponding to "good" and "bad" will take the form of a search for pairs that have the properties positivity/negativity (PN), mutual exclusiveness (ME), nonduplicity (ND), closeness (CL), and comparability with negation (CN). However, mutual exclusiveness (ME) will not be explicitly referred to, since it follows from the other properties.
Theorem T2
Let <G,B> be a pair of monadic predicates on the preference structure (L,R). Then if <G,B> fulfills PN, ND, and CN, it also fulfills ME.
A complete characterization of predicates fulfilling the properties
In this section, some new predicates for "good" and "bad" will be introduced, including "canonical good" and "canonical bad" (Definition Dll). Furthermore, some formal results for these predicates will be given, including a complete characterization of pairs of predicates that fulfill PN, CL, ND, and CN (Theorem T6).
The following definition and theorem provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a preference structure having a pair <G,B> that fulfills the four conditions PN, CL, and ND.
Definition D10
A preference structure (L,R) fulfills the weak structure condition (WSC) iff there are no p, q G L such that ~ pRpP + qR~q.
Theorem T3
Let (L,R) be a preference structure fulfilling WCA. Then if and only if it fulfills WSC is there a pair <G,B> of monadic operators on (L,R) that fulfills PN, CL, and ND.
Next, a pair of monadic operators, <G C ,B C >, will be defined. It can be shown to fulfill PN, CL, ND, and CN, in all preference structures fulfilling WCA and WSC. The index "C" of G c and B c stands for "canonical", for reasons to be explained in Section 6.
Definition Dll
Let (L,R) be a preference structure. Then the predicates G c for canonical good and B c for canonical bad are defined as follows:
Theorem T4
Let <L, R) be a preference structure fulfilling WCA and WSC. Then <G C ,B C >> as defined on {L,R), fulfills PN, CL, ND, and CN.
The pair <G C ,B C > can be shown to be "maximal" in the sense that if another pair <G,B> fulfills the conditions for being a plausible candidate for "good" and "bad", then Gp implies G c p and Bp implies B c p.
Theorem T5
Let ( The following definitions and theorem provide a complete characterization of all the pairs of monadic predicates that, given a preference structure (L,R), fulfill the conditions PN, CL, ND, and CN in this structure.
Definition D12
An
It should be obvious that I*-classes are equivalence classes.
Definition D13
A marginally good set is an I*-class S such that (1) if p G S, then G c p, and (2) It also follows from Theorem T6 that predicates for "good" and "bad" can be defined that are minimal in the same sense that G c and B c are maximal.
Definition D14
Let (L,R) be a preference structure. Then the predicates G m in for minimally good and B min for minimally bad are defined as follows:
Theorem T8
Let (L, R) be a preference structure fulfilling WCA and WSC, and let <G,B> be any pair of predicates on (L,R) that fulfills PN, CL, ND, and CN. Then G min p -> Gp and B min p -> Bp.
As was seen in Theorem T4, the maximally good and the maximally bad, i.e., G c and B c , combine into a pair <G C ,B C > that fulfills PN, CL, and ND in all preference structures that are capable of containing any pair with this property. The same does not apply to the minimally good (G min ) and the minimally bad (B min ). This can be seen from the following preference structure: L = {/?, A Q> ~q}> where R and P are transitive, and such that ~qPpPqP~p. In this structure <G c ,Bc>> <G c ,B min >, and <G min ,B c > all fulfill PN, CL, ND, and CN, but <G m i n ,B min > does not fulfill CL, since pPq & ~G min /? & ~B min #. A more general result, including a sufficient condition for <G min ,B m i n > to fulfill PN, CL, ND, and CN, is given in the following definition and theorem.
Definition D15
A preference structure (L,R) fulfills the property of infinite divisibility
Theorem T9
Let (L,R) be a preference structure fulfilling WCA and WSC. 5 Negation-related and indifference-related "good" and "bad"
In this section, two of the definitions of "good" and "bad" mentioned in Section 1 will be introduced into the formal system. The first of these is the definition of "good" as "better than its negation", and of "bad" as "worse than its negation".
Definition D16
Let (L,R) be a preference structure. Then the predicates G N for negation-related good and B N for negation-related bad are defined as follows:
The following definition and theorem provide a condition for <G N ,BN) to be, essentially, a plausible rendition of "good" and "bad".
Definition D17
Let (L 9 R) be a preference structure. It fulfills the strong structure condition (SSC) iff for all/?, q G L, ~pRpR*qR~q -+ ~plpl*ql~~q.
The intuitive understanding of the two conditions WSC and SSC may perhaps be furthered by a consideration of preference structures in which R, I, and P are transitive. In such structures, R and R* coincide, as do I and I* and P and P + . Then WSC excludes the following four structures (V denotes "better than" and « denotes "equal in value to"):
SSC excludes these same four structures, and in addition the following three:
Theorem T10
Let (L,R) be a preference structure that fulfills WCA. Then: 
Theorem Til
Let (L,R) be a preference structure fulfilling WCA and SSC. Further, let <G,B> be any pair of predicates on (L,R} that fulfills PN, CL, ND, and CN. Then:
As was also mentioned in Section 1, Chisholm and Sosa [5] propose another definition of "good" and "bad" in terms of "better". They suggest that a state of affairs is good if and only if it is better than some other state of affairs that is in its turn equal in value to its negation. Correspondingly, a state of affairs is bad if and only if it is worse than some other state of affairs that is in its turn equal in value to its negation. This version of "good" and "bad" can be introduced into the formal system as follows:
Definition D18
Let (L,R) be a preference structure. Then the predicates GΪ for indifference-related good and Bι for indifference-related bad are defined as follows:
B γ p^{lq){-qlqVp).

Theorem T12
Let (L 9 R) be a preference structure that fulfills WCA and WSC. Then for all p, q G L: (1) 
pCqI~q ^> (Grf++GcP) (2)pCql-q-^(B ι p^B c p).
Corollary C2 Let (L,R) be a preference structure that fulfills WCA and WSC, and such that (Vp)(lq)(pCqI~q). Then for all p G L, G γ p^G c p and Bιp++ B c p
Corollary C3
Let <L,R) be a preference structure that fulfills WCA, WSC,
and SSC, and such that (Vp){lq)(pCq\~q). Then for all p EL, G λ p^G^p and B\p <-> B N p.
Corollary C2 shows that <GI,BI> coincides with <G C ,B C > in those preference structures for which the definition of <GI,BI> seems to be intended. Corollary C3 shows that, in all preference structures in which both <G If Bi> and <G N ,B N > are plausible renditions of "good" and "bad", the two coincide.
Conclusions
Of the different candidates for "good" and "bad" G c and B c have properties that give them a special standing. Provided that the weak comparability assumption (WCA) holds, the pair <G C ,B C > fulfills the conditions of positivity/negativity (PN), closeness (CL), and nonduplicity (ND) in all preference structures in which any pair of predicates can fulfill these conditions (Theorems T3 and T4). If full comparability holds, then <G C ,B C > is the only pair that fulfills these conditions (Theorem T7). If full comparability does not hold, there may also be other pairs that fulfill the conditions. They may be seen as weakened forms of <G C ,B C >, assigning a neutral value to some (marginal) states of affairs that are assigned "good" or "bad" by <G c ,Bc> (Theorem T6).
Two other definitions of "good" and "bad" proposed by previous authors have a strong intuitive plausibility. They are negation-related "good" and "bad" as proposed by Brogan, and indifference-related "good" and "bad" as proposed by Chisholm and Sosa. They are both closely related to <G c ,Bc>> and may be seen as special cases of the latter, though applicable in a smaller range of preference structures.
Negation-related "good" and "bad" «G N ,B N » fulfill plausible conditions for "good" and "bad" only in preference structures fulfilling the strong structure condition (SSC) of Definition D17. In such structures, G N and G c coincide, as do B N and B c (Theorem T10).
Indifference-related "good" and "bad" «G I ,Bi» are plausible only in structures where each proposition is comparable to a proposition that is equal in value to its negation. In such structures, G! and G c coincide, as do I*! and B c (Corollary C2 of Theorem T12).
In preference structures where both negation-related «G N ,B N » and indifference-related ((G^Bj)) "good" and "bad" are plausible (i.e., where it is both the case that SSC holds and that each proposition is comparable to a proposition that is equal in value to its negation), G N and G c coincide, as do B N and B c (Corollary C3 of Theorem T12). This result indicates that the difference between these two definitions of "good" and "bad" should not be seen as concerning how to define these two monadic value-terms, given a preference structure. Rather, it should be seen as resulting from different views on which preference structures are plausible.
The above formal results lend support to the conclusion that "good" and "bad" are definable in terms of "better". <G C ,B C > is the most general definition of them, whereas <G N ,B N > and <GI,BI) are special cases, applicable only in a smaller range of preference structures than is <G c ,Bc> This is the reason for the suggested names "canonical good" and "canonical bad" for G c and B c .
As was pointed out to me by Thorild Dahlquist, however, although <G c ,Bc> is in this sense the most general pair of predicates for "good" and "bad", the definition format proposed by van Dalen [6] is in another sense more general. As was mentioned in Section 1, this format consists in the introduction of a set of neutral propositions, such that anything is good (bad) that is better (worse) than some neutral proposition. Since this format does not refer to negations, it may be applied to objects of valuation other than propositions, such as physical objects per se. The same style of definition may also be used for other triads of adjectives that are analogous to good-better-bad, such as bigbigger-small and happy-happier-unhappy. (On the logic of the positive, comparative, and opposite of adjectives see [3] .)
The definability of "good" and "bad" in terms of "better" lends some plausibility to the opinion that "better" is "the fundamental value universal" [4] , "the value-fundamental" [18] , or "the basic notion of normative logic" ( [11] , p. 197).
However, it does not follow that "[v]alue judgements . . . have the form Ά is better than B 9 or [that] they can be reduced to this form" ( [14] , p. 114; cf. [16] ). Although two such important monadic value predicates as "good" and "bad" can be defined in terms of "better" (as can, of course, "best" and "worst"), other monadic value predicates cannot be so defined. Informal discourse on values would be sadly incomplete without such predicates as "very bad", "acceptable", and "excellent".
Appendix: Outline of proofs
An outline of proofs will be given for Theorems T4, T6, T9, T10, and T12. The proofs of the rest of the theorems are straightforward enough to be left to the reader. Thus, in all four cases, a contradiction can be derived. This completes the proof that CL holds. The proofs that PN, ND, and CN hold are all straightforward. From qRp it follows that either q\p or qPp. First suppose q\p. From Gp it follows, by (2) For (ii), suppose q G S and qP + r. Since #P + r there are s and ^ such that qR*sPtR*r. Since CL is assumed to hold for <G,B>, Gs v Bt. Suppose Gs. Then, by qR*s and the positivity of G, Gq. Furthermore, by pl*q and the positivity of G, Gp, contrary to the conditions. Thus -Gs. Then, since Gs v Bt, we have Bt.
Proof of Theorem
By the negativity of B, Br can be derived from Bί and tR*r. From Br and CN, ~rPr v rR~r follows. Suppose rR~r. Then, by the negativity of B, B~r, contrary to ND. Thus -rPr.
(2): The proof is similar to the proof of (1). Thus in all three cases a contradiction has been derived. This completes the proof of (1).
The proofs of parts (2) and (3) are straightforward.
Proof of Theorem T12:
Only part (1) will be proved here; part (2) can be proved in the same way. ΈrompCql-q it follows that either pPql~q, plql~q 9 or -qlqPp. The proof proceeds by these three cases. 
